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Title
Justified True Belief (JTB) - Knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief if conditions of justification, truth and belief are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of the given claim.
In the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge.
Alvin Platinga:
According to the inherited lore of the epistemological tribe, the JTB justified true belief account enjoyed the status of epistemological orthodoxy until 1963, when it was shattered by Edmund Gettier… Of course, there is an interesting historical irony here: it isn’t easy to find many really explicit statements of a JTB analysis of knowledge prior to Gettier. It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it.
Strictly speaking, most contemporary philosophers deny the JTB definition of knowledge, at least in its exact form. Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples were very influential in shaping this contemporary outlook. They usually involve some form of cognitive luck whereby the justification is not responsible or relevant to the belief being true.
Others see the problems as insurmountable and propose radical new conceptions of knowledge, many of which do not require justification at all. Between these two extremes, various epistemologists have settled for a moderate departure from the standard definition. They usually accept that it is a step in the right direction: justified true belief is necessary for knowledge. However, they deny that it is sufficient. This means that knowledge always implies justified true belief but that not every justified true belief constitutes knowledge.